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Abstract 
 
The paper investigates how poll information and coalition signals affect strategic 
voting, defined as casting a vote for a party other than the most preferred party to better 
influence the election outcome. In particular if the outcome of an election is perceived to 
be close, voters in multi-party systems with proportional representation and coalition 
governments should have an incentive to cast a vote for the party that best influences 
the formation of the next government. The study focuses in particular on voters’ 
attention to and perception of polls and coalition signals sent by parties before elections. 
The study used an innovative design that embedded a laboratory experiment in two real 
election campaigns, allowing the manipulation of poll results and coalition signals in a 
realistic environment. The findings suggest that political sophistication plays a crucial 
role for the accurate perception of polls and strategic voting. Coalition signals are found 
to have a surprisingly strong effect on (apparently) strategic voting.  
 
 
Authors’ note: We thank Franz Urban Pappi for helpful suggestions and Lena Gentil, 
Alex Ienasiga, Nathalie Marmull, and Nora Schütze for skillful research assistance. 
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What can you do when your preferred party has no chance of winning in the 
upcoming election? One possibility is to just stay at home. However, voters who feel a 
citizens’ duty to vote and who care about the outcome of the next election might rather 
decide that it is better to cast a vote for a less-preferred party, but one that will play a 
more decisive role in the formation of the new government (Cox 1997). In fact, voters in 
multiparty systems with proportional representation and coalition governments will often 
not only find themselves in such a situation but will also have options to do something 
about it. Instead of aiming at the mere satisfaction of casting an expressive vote for the 
most preferred party, strategic voters are guided by instrumental considerations, with 
desirable policy outcomes trumping preferences for individual parties. In short, 
paraphrasing a well-known former secretary of defense, strategic voters work with the 
parties they have, not the parties they want. 
What are the conditions under which this can happen? So far, we do not know 
much about the conditions and processes that lead voters to vote strategically, except 
for two crucial conditions. First, strategic voting becomes only plausible if the outcome 
of the election is perceived as close, so that voters can at least believe that their vote 
(and that of like-minded voters) will be decisive (Acevedo and Krueger 2004). Second, 
strategic voting is a form of sophisticated decision making that requires detailed 
knowledge and information about the electoral chances of the parties as well as the 
possible coalitions after the election. While these assumptions are compelling, there is 
hardly any evidence at the individual level that shows whether and how strategic voters 
conform to these expectations. This, in short, is the main purpose of this study. We 
investigate the factors that affect voters’ attention to and perception of crucial pre-
electoral information, polls and coalition signals, and their influence on a particular type 
of voting behavior, strategic voting. The basic idea is that voters who realize—given the 
objective condition of a close election—that voting for their first choice of party or 
candidate will be a “wasted” vote might reconsider and vote for an alternative choice 
that will have an effect on the formation of a new government.  
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Strategic Voting 
By definition, a strategic voter is not driven by the urge to express a deeply held 
party preference but motivated by the desire to influence the election outcome in 
general and government formation in particular. If voting for the preferred party does not 
promise to lead to a desirable outcome, for example because the initially chosen party 
might fail to pass a minimum vote share threshold to enter parliament, or because it 
cannot be expected to play any role during the formation of a coalition government, a 
strategic voter should rather vote for a party that he or she might prefer less but that is 
more decisive in producing a desirable outcome.  
Strategic voting, or more precisely, behavior that looks like strategic voting, has 
been documented for a variety of election systems, from parliamentary democracies to 
presidential systems, using different electoral rules. Evidence has been found for 
countries such as Germany (Bawn 1999; Pappi & Thurner 2002), Great Britain (Alvarez 
& Nagler 2000, Franklin, Niemi, & Whitten 1994, Lanoue & Bowler 1992, Niemi, Whitten 
& Franklin 1992, 1993), The Netherlands (Irwin & Van Holsteyn 2002, 2003), Canada 
(Blais et al. 2001, Blais et al. 2005, Lanoue & Bowler 1998), New Zealand (Karp et al. 
2002), and the USA (Abramson et al. 1992, 1995). While evidence for strategic voting 
can be found for most elections, the number of voters who actually engage in strategic 
voting is fairly low and typically ranges between 5 and 15 percent of the electorate. 
Strategic voting only makes sense, after all, if the appropriate conditions are given, 
primarily a close race and plausible alternative choices (e.g. Alvarez, Boehmke, & 
Nagler 2006). 
Strategic voting behavior has been very well documented for electoral systems 
with single member districts and plurality elections, most notably Great Britain, and to a 
lesser degree for electoral systems with multiparty systems using proportional 
representation (Cox 1997). The latter type of system usually leads to coalition 
governments but also offers a number of circumstances warranting strategic 
considerations. First, proportional representation is usually not free from important 
restrictions, most notably a minimum threshold of votes that a party must reach to 
become eligible for seats in parliament. Failing such a threshold means that a vote for a 
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party is “wasted” or “lost” because it does not count toward the distribution of seats in 
parliament. Small parties that are close to the threshold—or fail to pass the threshold—
should raise strategic considerations of the electoral chances among supporters. 
Strategic voters might also be found among supporters of major parties. If their 
preferred party has a junior coalition partner who is in danger of falling below the 
electoral threshold necessary for representation, they might be motivated to employ a 
coalition insurance strategy. Casting a strategic list vote for the junior coalition partner 
might ensure that it can pass the threshold and make the preferred coalition possible. If 
the junior partner fails to overcome that threshold, the senior partner alone might not 
play a leading role in the prospective government, or might be entirely out of contention.  
Our expectation is deceptively simple: A close election and plausible alternative 
choices will increase the likelihood of strategic voting. The challenge is to find, or more 
precisely, to create circumstances under which voters face a close election for their 
preferred party (or parties), along with available options to vote strategically. The 
solution we propose below involves an experimental manipulation of poll information to 
create theoretically relevant scenarios, all in the context of actual election campaigns. 
First, the two crucial sources of information, polls and coalition signals, require some 
additional discussion. 
 
Attention to Poll Information and Effects 
Polls are a fact of life in political campaigns and widely reported in the media. 
The question whether polls have any consistent effect on voters, however, is far from 
settled. In fact, some expectations are contradictory. For example, the bandwagon 
effect holds that a party or candidate leading in the polls will attract further support, 
while the underdog effect claims the exact opposite. Without discussing the merits of 
these hypotheses (see Mutz [1998] for a detailed discussion), it should be noted that it 
will always be possible to find instances that support these notions, but that they fail to 
establish universal rules. More important, such simplistic responses to social cues are 
not of primary interest when it comes to strategic voting. The theory of strategic voting 
assumes that voters form rational expectations about the outcome of an election, or 
more precisely, how well the parties will perform in the upcoming election (Cox 1997). 
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Thus, the crucial question is whether (strategic) voters not only pay attention to poll 
information but also perceive such information accurately. The key criterion to assess 
voters’ ability to form rational expectations is the quality or accuracy of their 
expectations about the outcome of the upcoming election. The most important source of 
pertinent information are pre-election polls widely disseminated in the media during 
political campaigns.  
The availability of reliable polls, however, is not enough. When it comes to 
political expectations, evidence from public opinion research points to a highly prevalent 
projection effect. Expectations are strongly shaped or distorted by existing political 
preferences (Abramson et al. 1992, Babad 1995, Babad, Hills & O’Diskroll 1992, Bartels 
1985, 1987, Blais & Turgeon 2004, Dolan & Holbrook 2001, Gimpel & Harvey 1997, 
Granberg & Brent 1983, Johnston et al. 1992, Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet 1944, 
Lewis-Beck & Skalaban 1989, Mutz 1998). For example, Schoen (1999, 2000) shows 
for Germany that the expectation about whether or not small parties will pass the 5%-
threshold to enter parliament is shaped by party identifications. Voters tend to 
overestimate the chances of preferred small parties while underestimating the chances 
of disliked small parties. The literature cited above suggests that expectations are a 
product of both, preference-driven projections as well as objective external sources of 
information such as polls. The opposite case—that expectations influence 
preferences—is possible as well but given only very low probability in the literature 
(Granberg & Brent 1983, Mutz 1998). 
If we accept that polls are the primary source of (comparatively) objective 
information about the possible outcome of an upcoming election, the more pertinent 
question becomes who pays attention to polls and who uses such information to make 
better predictions of electoral outcomes. The most obvious answer is political 
sophisticates. Voters with a high level of political knowledge should be most aware of 
the latest polls and thus have the ability to make more accurate election forecasts. 
Awareness of political information is, after all, a defining characteristic of political 
sophistication (Zaller 1992). Dolan and Holbrook (2001), for example, found knowledge 
to improve the forecasting accuracy of voters. While mere “membership in the polity” 
(Lewis-Beck & Skalaban 1989; see also Irwin & Van Holsteyn 2002) should be enough 
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to enable reasonable predictions, access to current polls is required for accurate 
forecasts.  
Even low sophisticates are not necessarily lost. Access and attention to poll 
information in the media should make it possible for virtually every voter interested in 
meaningful forecasts to do so, and work against the projection effect at the same time. 
Unless an individual chooses to disregard or misperceive objective information, factual 
information should constrain the projection effect. The evidence, however, is mixed. 
Babad (1995), for example, found that access to relevant information did not prevent 
wishful thinking from occurring, while Babad et al. (1992) found that information reduced 
wishful thinking to zero.  
Access to information and knowledge are not the only factors that might lead to 
more accurate forecasts. Theories of motivated information processing see a link 
between the motivation to hold accurate attitudes and a more careful processing of 
information (Kunda 1990). An “intuitive scientist“ wants to maximize accuracy while an 
“intuitive lawyer“ wants to support existing conclusions (Baumeister & Newman 1994). A 
voter concerned about the outcome of the upcoming election and unsure about which 
party to vote for—a strategic voter would be a prominent exemplar—should have a 
strong accuracy motivation.  
Because attention and comprehension of news requires motivation and ability to 
do so, we expect that political sophisticates are the key voter segment that is both 
interested in and able to use this information. In short, political sophisticates have the 
motivation and ability to (a) pay attention to poll information and to (b) accurately 
perceive such information. In contrast, partisan voters might also have the motivation to 
pay attention to poll information, but they have no incentive or need to curtail wishful 
thinking or to accurately perceive such information. 
 
Coalition Signals 
Polls are a critical source of information for strategic voters, but they are not the 
only useful source. As already pointed out, parliamentary systems using proportional 
representation are usually governed by coalitions of two or more parties. Individual 
parties mostly fail to obtain an absolute majority of seats to govern alone (Katz 1997). 
Polls, Coalition Signals, and Strategic Voting        7 
Even if voters usually cast only a single vote for one party, they might very well be 
aware of possible coalitions after the election and might take these expectations into 
account (Blais et al. 2006). In fact, parties will often and explicitly send out signals to 
either rule out a coalition with another party or to announce a preference for a future 
coalition partner. Such cues or signals should help voters when deciding how to cast a 
vote. In particular strategic voters should value such information. If two parties have 
(credibly) ruled out a specific coalition, it will not make sense for a strategic voter to vote 
with the intention of giving such a coalition a majority. 
In the case of Germany, the setting of our study, parties often use specific 
appeals or coalition signals to explicitly suggest to voters to use their party vote 
strategically (Schoen 2000).1 These appeals will often be negative in the sense of ruling 
out a coalition with some other party, often in an attempt to project electoral “strength” 
by denying the need for a coalition partner. Negative appeals might be the default 
response but with limited credibility as a given electoral outcome will often only allow 
specific coalitions, no matter the denials before an election. The more interesting 
appeals are positive, signaling to voters a desirable coalition partner (while implicitly 
admitting that they need a partner to win). The typical example is an incumbent or 
proposed two-party coalition with a strong major party and a weak junior partner who is 
in danger of failing the electoral threshold. In such circumstances, German parties often 
resort to explicit appeals for strategic voting in the form of “Leihstimmen” (loan votes). 
Supporters of the safe major party are asked to cast, or “rent out,” a vote for the small 
coalition partner to insure the minor party’s entry into parliament, making the desired 
coalition possible.  
If coalition signals turn out to be a driving force behind strategic voting, it would 
have interesting implications for the theory of strategic voting. By merely following such 
a signal, a strategic vote would not necessarily be the result of a sophisticated and 
                                                 
1 In national and most state elections, German voters cast two votes, the “first” vote for 
a candidate in a given electoral district, and the “second” but critical vote for a party list. 
The latter vote determines the actual distribution of seats in parliament. Casting two 
votes at the same time clearly offers the additional opportunity for strategic ticket 
splitting by voting for different parties (Gschwend 2004). In this study, however, we only 
look at the critical second vote that constitutes a hard test of strategic voting behavior.  
Polls, Coalition Signals, and Strategic Voting        8 
informed decision process but rather a passive reaction to explicit appeals by the 
parties. As such, it would be more appropriate to classify such electoral decisions as 
insincere voting (assuming that only a vote for the most-preferred party is sincere). In 
short, our final expectation is that coalition signals increase the likelihood of strategic or 
insincere voting, independent of political sophistication. 
 
Experimental Study Design 
The goal of the study is to test the effects of polls and coalition signals on 
strategic voting. This raises a number of methodological issues. The vast majority of 
studies about strategic voting at the individual level are based on cross-sectional 
surveys, conducted before or after a single election. This creates the fundamental 
problem that it is more or less impossible to establish causality. This is a particularly 
serious problem when the relationship of preferences and expectations are unclear and 
possibly reciprocal. Second, looking at a single election usually does not provide much 
variation in the polls or coalition signals. Both are fairly stable and consistent before 
elections, and every voter will receive more or less the same information. As a 
consequence, it is nearly impossible to establish a causal link of exposure to polls and 
other signals with political behavior. Even if objective conditions favoring strategic voting 
exist, they might only affect a small part of the electorate (see Alvarez, Boehmke, & 
Nagler 2006). In short, it is very difficult to determine the effect of polls and coalition 
signals and the tendency to vote strategically with cross-sectional surveys  
As alternative, laboratory experiments can overcome the problem of establishing 
causality by clearly separating cause and effect. They allow the careful construction of 
“objective” conditions such as a close election that should facilitate strategic voting. 
However, laboratory studies come with the downside of limited external validity. 
Experiments usually use fictitious scenarios that might make excellent tests of causal 
hypotheses but that fail to account for the complexity of real world elections. 
Because the goal of our study is to test the causal effects of polls and coalition 
signals on strategic voting, we chose the experimental approach. However, instead of 
creating a fictitious election campaign, we embedded the experiment in two real election 
campaigns. The information used in the study was drawn from actual parties and their 
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platforms, and only the poll information and coalition signals were manipulated within a 
plausible range. A crucial advantage of such an approach is the possibility to tap into 
and use the actual party preferences of the participants, making a strategic voting 
decision more “costly” compared to purely fictional campaigns. At the same time, this 
approach allows the random assignment of participants to different poll-based scenarios 
to test whether different “objective” conditions of close elections have the expected 
effect on strategic voting. 
 
Background Information about Campaigns 
The study took place in January 2006, at the beginning of two simultaneous 
election campaigns in the two adjacent German states Baden-Württemberg and 
Rhineland-Palatinate. Both elections were held on March 26. Both states share a 
number of relevant characteristics. First, the five parties that could reasonably be 
expected to successfully enter parliament were identical and included two large 
parties—the conservative Christian Democrats (CDU) and the left-of-center Social 
Democrats (SPD)—as well as three smaller parties—the liberal Free Democrats (FDP), 
the environmental Green Party (Greens), and a new far-left party (WASG), mostly 
drawing on disaffected and/or former members of labor unions and the SPD. Second, 
both states were governed by fairly popular coalition governments (with one large and 
one small party) that could reasonably be expected to be re-elected. Third, both states 
use an electoral system with proportional representation in which voters have a single 
party list vote that determines who will be represented in the state legislature.2 Parties 
have to pass a 5%-threshold to enter parliament. Fourth, the party platforms in both 
states were, for all practical purposes, identical except for state-specific differences and 
issues. None of the latter played any notable role during both campaigns. 
Despite all these commonalities, there was (and is) a key difference between the 
two states: two different coalition governments. Baden-Württemberg was governed by a 
CDU-led coalition while Rhineland-Palatinate was governed by an SPD-led coalition. In 
                                                 
2 Voters in Rhineland-Palatinate also have the additional option to cast a plurality vote 
for a candidate in their district. This vote does not affect the distribution of seats in 
parliament (only the candidates who fill these seats). In our study, participants could 
only cast a single party list vote.  
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both cases, the FDP was the junior coalition partner. While a re-election of the two 
coalitions was the most likely outcome in both states, it was also quite plausible that the 
Greens could replace the FDP as the junior coalition partner, depending on the election 
outcome. In comparison, the electoral strength of the new WASG was much more 
uncertain, and the likelihood that it would join a coalition, even with the left-of-center 
SPD, extremely small.  
Taken together, the two states offered the opportunity, just before the start of the 
actual election campaign, to create scenarios that would either facilitate or inhibit 
strategic voting, depending on different but plausible polls and coalition signals. 
Because there was no doubt that the incumbent large party would win again in each 
state, the plausible manipulations had to focus on the expected performance of the 
three small parties, including whether they would successfully pass the 5%-threshold to 
enter parliament and whether one of them would pull ahead of the other two small 
parties. In addition, it was possible to create comparable contexts or decision scenarios 
by “sending” study participants to the state that best matched their political preferences 
while (randomly) manipulating the factors of interest. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
A total of 280 students (105 female and 169 male; mean age 25 years, ranging 
from 18 to 50 years) participated in the computer-based experiment conduced at the 
beginning of—and embedded in—two German state election campaigns in January 
2006. For the analyses, only the 200 participants who were eligible to vote in German 
elections were used.3 The participants took about 50 minutes to complete the study and 
received €7 (about $10) for their participation. Participants were told that the purpose of 
                                                 
3 The data of 6 participants was lost due to technical problems with the experimental 
software or other computer problems. 69 participants who were not eligible to vote were 
excluded because their knowledge of German politics was significantly lower compared 
to native participants and, most critically, they did not have well-developed preferences 
for German parties, a necessary prerequisite to analyze strategic voting (defined as a 
vote deviating from an existing party preference). Finally, 5 participants were excluded 
because they had already participated in the pilot study. 
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the study was to investigate how voters inform themselves during an election campaign. 
More specifically, they were asked to take on the role of a voter and prepare to vote in 
the upcoming state election by choosing and reading information about the parties and 
the campaign (including the unobtrusively embedded polls and coalition signals).  
 
Information Search: Process Tracing with a Dynamic Information Board 
Study participants were exposed to a stream of quickly changing campaign 
information on a dynamic information board. The information covered party positions on 
various issues as well as poll results and coalition signals. Similar to Lau and Redlawsk 
(1997; Redlawsk 2001, 2002) and Meffert et al. (2006), the information board displayed 
information sequentially. Out of necessity, participants were forced to be selective in 
their choice of messages based on short headlines. Custom-developed software was 
used to both present and track the information selection behavior of the participants. 
Unlike earlier information board designs (i.e., Huang & Price 2001; Lau & Redlawsk 
1997; Redlawsk 2001), our information board did not use labels such as “political 
experience” or “position on abortion” to categorize and pre-sort the headlines according 
to specific types of information. Instead, the information appeared as an apparently 
random stream of messages similar to newspaper headlines on a website (e.g., “CDU 
proposes a privileged partnership with Turkey”).  
 
Campaign Information 
The campaign information consisted in total of 90 headlines and articles that 
were presented on 15 subsequent screens, with always six headlines visible on each 
screen (Figure 1). Each screen was called a “week” to simulate and highlight the 
passing of time until the election. 75 headlines and articles were party-specific and 
covered the five relevant parties running in the two elections (CDU, SPD, FDP, Greens, 
and WASG). For each party, the information covered two leading candidates as well as 
the official party positions on 13 different issues (including fairly generic topics such as 
statements about “innovation” and the “economy” and fairly specific and current topics 
such as the introduction of tuition at universities, the fight against bird flu, and 
prohibitions for state employees to wear a veil). The remaining 15 articles were split 
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evenly between five articles covering manipulated pre-election polls (see below), five 
articles about other (actual) “generic” polls without any direct electoral link such as the 
popularity of state politicians or the satisfaction with the personal financial situation, and 
five purely informational articles about each state’s current issues or political history.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Manipulation of Information: Polls and Coalition Signals 
The poll results were manipulated to affect the expectation of how close the 
upcoming election would be. Such a manipulation was made possible by the fact that 
the study took place right before the actual campaigns got under way and the media 
started to report about polls. With the exception of election campaigns, media reports 
about state-level polls are very rare in Germany. At the same time, the manipulations 
had to be plausible and were thus constrained by the political reality in each state. In 
both states, the governing coalitions were expected to be re-elected and there was no 
doubt that one of the two large parties would win decisively while the other would finish 
a distant second without any chance of forming a government. As a consequence, the 
poll manipulation focused on the more uncertain outcome for the three small parties. As 
potential coalition partners of the respective large party, they would play a pivotal role in 
the formation of the new government.  
Both poll and coalition signal manipulation had a systematic and a random 
component. At the beginning of the study, participants were asked for a ranking of the 
five parties by preference. This ranking was used for three systematic assignments that 
created standardized electoral scenarios with comparable conditions for the participants. 
First, and depending on the major party ranked highest, participants were assigned 
either to the state Baden-Württemberg (with a CDU-led government) or the state 
Rhineland-Palatinate (with an SPD-led government). As a consequence, the most-
preferred major party for all participants was expected to win the upcoming election. 
Second, the highest ranked small party was used for the closeness manipulation of the 
polls and for the coalition signal manipulation. The small party was assumed to 
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represent the preferred coalition partner for the preferred large party.4 Third, depending 
on which party was ranked highest, participants were categorized in either major-party 
or small-party supporters. The latter categorization determined how the poll 
manipulation would create a “close” election outcome based on the 5%-threshold. 
Next, participants were randomly assigned to one of three poll conditions that 
suggested election outcomes of varying closeness. In the control condition, the 
preferred major party (“41%”) and the preferred small party (“10%”) were expected to 
comfortably win the election and constitute the only possible coalition (with the obvious 
exception of a great coalition between the two major parties, an outcome that was not 
considered likely). In the close election condition, the preferred small party was either 
just on the threshold required for entering parliament and thus in acute danger of failing 
(“5%”, for major party supporters) or just below the threshold and thus expected to fail to 
enter parliament (“4%”, for small party supporters). In each case, the polls create classic 
scenarios for strategic voting. Major party supporters might decide to depart their safe 
and dominant major party and vote for the preferred small coalition partner to ensure 
the party’s entry into parliament. Small party supporters should instead realize that their 
vote would be “wasted” on a party that has no chance to enter parliament and that it 
could be better used for a party with a realistic chance to become part of the next 
government. In the competition condition, the three small parties were running head-to-
head, with about “7%” each. This scenario provides an incentive for strategic voting for 
major party supporters (to give the preferred small party an edge over the competitors) 
but should work against strategic voting for small party supporters who should rather be 
motivated to support the preferred party. Participants were assigned to the three 
conditions with 20, 50, and 30 percent probability (with the assumption, based on a pilot 
study, that participants would be split about evenly between major party and small party 
supporters). For the analyses reported here, the different conditions are combined in 
two categories, depending on whether or not the poll created a “close” election outcome 
for a given participant. 
                                                 
4 Participants were explicitly asked about their coalition preferences later in the study. 
The responses more or less confirmed this expectation. 
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The coalition signal manipulation was operationalized in a fairly straightforward 
manner. The poll articles either made no reference at all to possible coalitions or used 
the preferred major party and the preferred small party to indicate that such a coalition 
was supported by prominent politicians in each party.5 The signals were embedded in 
typical headlines and slogans used during elections, for example stating that politicians 
of the (preferred) major party were “hoping for a coalition with [the preferred small 
party]” or that politicians of the small party are “appealing for ‘Leihstimmen’ (loan votes) 
of [the preferred major party] supporters.” The two signal conditions were assigned 
randomly with even probability and independent of the poll condition.  
The five articles that reported in more detail about the manipulated polls were 
phrased identically in each poll condition. Only the names of the parties were 
automatically substituted depending on the party preferences of each participant. 
Participants encountered the manipulated information in two ways. Early during 
the information search (after two screens with headlines), all participants were asked to 
participate in a pre-election poll. After answering the poll, they were shown a results 
page (Figure 2) that presented a table with the manipulated poll results on the left and a 
short verbal (headline-style) summary of the results on the right, highlighting the 
“closeness” of the poll for those who fail to draw these conclusions from a numerical 
table on their own. On the bottom, two brief statements attributed to the two preferred 
parties of each participant, again in newspaper headline format, were used for the 
coalition signal manipulation. All participants encountered and read this page before 
continuing with the information board task. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
The second opportunity to encounter poll results was as part of the information 
displayed on the information board. The five articles covering the manipulated polls (out 
of 90 total) presented the same poll results and coalition signals but highlighted different 
aspects, using a different framing. Unlike the poll results page described above, 
                                                 
5 The coalition signals were carefully phrased to be plausible whether or not this 
coalition represented the governing coalition in a given state or whether it would involve 
a new coalition after the election.  
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participants had to deliberately select these five articles for reading. Consequently, they 
offer a hard test of attention to pre-election polls. 
 
Procedures and Measures  
Participants started by indicating their position on or agreement with 14 political 
issues (see Figure 3 for a plan of the study). Next, they were asked to rank the five 
parties CDU, SPD, FDP, Greens, and WASG by preference. These responses were 
used for the systematic assignment to the poll and signal conditions as described above. 
Participants read a brief introduction to the state election campaign of the assigned 
state, followed by an introduction and a trial run of the information board. After 
completing the trial run, the main task of the study started. The 90 headlines were 
presented on the information board, always six headlines on each screen that remained 
visible for a fixed interval of 45 seconds (Figure 1). The six headlines on each screen 
always covered the six information categories defined by the five parties (either issue 
positions or candidate information) and a sixth category with polls or other state-related 
information. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
Participants were instructed that they could choose any article for reading by 
clicking on the headline. The associated article with a length of approximately 120 
words opened in a window partially covering the headline page of the information board 
(Figure 4). The article page remained open until it was closed again by the participant.  
[Figure 4 about here] 
Participants were allowed to read as many articles as they wanted, but even 
while they were reading an article, the headlines on the front page continued to change 
at the fixed interval of 45 seconds. During the campaign, all participants were exposed 
to the same 90 headlines, but the order of headlines both across the 15 weeks and 
within each screen was randomized. After the first two screens, the search was 
interrupted and paused for the pre-election poll that asked participants to indicate their 
party preference at that time (with an additional “don’t know” option), followed by the 
“results” page which summarized the manipulated polls and coalition signals (Figure 2). 
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After the information search ended, participants were asked to vote for their final 
party choice, followed by an open-ended listing of reasons for their vote as well as a 
rating of a series of reasons frequently given by voters. The latter reasons included one 
statement typical for strategic voters (see Fisher 2004)—“My preferred party has no 
chance”—as well as one about habitual voting, a behavior that should work against 
strategic voting—“I always vote for this party.” Participants indicated the degree to 
which these reasons applied to their vote decision on a 5-point rating scale. Participants 
were also asked to make a forecast of the election outcome, including precise party 
vote shares and the lower and upper bounds for each party vote share prediction (a 
90%-confidence interval). Given the difficulty of this task, the software assisted making 
this forecast by making sure that the party predictions added up to 100 percent, and that 
the predicted lower and upper limits for each party vote share prediction were below or 
above these forecasts. Participants had to provide complete data before continuing. To 
determine the accuracy of the forecasts, the manipulated “objective” poll results were 
subtracted from each participant’s party vote share predictions and averaged to 
calculate the mean absolute error (MAE) of the predictions. In other words, the MAE 
measures the extent to which the predictions deviate from the polls. The order of the 
two tasks, vote decision (with listing and rating of reasons) and forecast, was 
randomized, but because no order effect was found in the analyses reported below, it is 
not further addressed in this paper. 
The study continued with detailed questions about party and coalition 
preferences and other political orientations of the participants. Standard measures 
relevant for the subsequent analysis are political interest and the strength of party 
identification. Participants listed their demographics (e.g. sex) and were asked about 
their attitudes towards polls. More specifically, they were asked about their attention to 
polls before elections (5-point scale), the perceived accuracy of polls (4-point scale), 
whether they usually consider polls when making a vote decision (5-point scale), and, 
as a control question, about the time of their last encounter with (real) state-specific 
polls (six response options).6  
                                                 
6 In Germany, publicly available polls at the state level are not very frequent and usually 
do not receive prominent attention in the media unless shortly before the election. The 
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At the end, participants responded to an open-ended political knowledge scale 
that included 14 factual questions about the offices or positions of various national and 
international politicians (or vice versa) as well as questions about the political system 
(Mean = 6.59, SD = 3.10). 
 
Results 
 
The analyses start with a manipulation check by summarizing descriptively the 
use and perceptions of the manipulated polls. Next, the factors affecting the use and 
perceptions of polls and coalition signals is assessed more formally, followed by an 
analysis of the effects of poll and signal information on the voting behavior of 
participants. 
 
Manipulation Check: Use and Perception of Manipulated Polls 
Participants selected and read on average 29 articles including about two articles 
(out of five) covering manipulated polls and coalition signals (Figure 5). Together with 
the poll results page seen by all participants, participants did have a fairly high chance 
of encountering the same poll information repeatedly. The interest in poll-related articles 
was even higher if the articles with generic (not manipulated) poll information are added 
as well. On average, participants read 1.7 generic poll articles (out of five) covering the 
popularity of state politicians, surveys about satisfaction with the personal financial 
situation, and similar topics. At the same time, however, the articles covering polls were 
not the primary interest of the participants. With an average of slightly more than seven 
articles, they paid by far the most attention to information about their most preferred 
party. In fact, the attention to articles about the different parties tracks perfectly with the 
party ranking given by the participants at the beginning of the study. 
[Figure 5 about here] 
                                                                                                                                                             
last poll reported in the media preceding this study happened one and half months 
before the study. On the last day of the study, however, the media reported the results 
of a new poll in one of the states. Of about 40 study participants who could have 
encountered information about this poll, only nine reported being aware of it, with no 
further evidence that is affected their forecasts. 
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The next and more important question is whether participants not only viewed the 
manipulated polls but used this information to calibrate their predictions. To assess this 
impact, we looked at the critical component of the poll manipulation, the forecasts for 
the most preferred small party. As Figure 6 shows, the poll manipulation was successful, 
at least in relative terms. The average predicted vote share for the most preferred small 
party declines significantly with lower poll values, from a high of 9.8% in the control 
condition to a low of 6.4% in the “failure” condition (F = 9.85, p < .001). The same 
applies to the predicted lower limit of the party vote share, ranging from 6.6% to 4.1% (F 
= 18.59, p < .001). The evidence for the predicted upper limit of the vote shares follows 
a similar pattern from 12.8% to 6.6% (F = 10.64, p < .001). Even though the polls 
significantly affected the forecasts, the latter are not entirely “accurate.” With the 
exception of the control condition with a fairly high “10%”-poll, the forecasts exhibit 
considerable projection effects. On average, participants added between 1.7 and 2.9 
percentage points to the polls, expecting the preferred small party to perform more 
successfully than predicted by the “official” polls. Even in the “failure” condition, the 
party is expected to safely pass the 5%-threshold. For this reason, the predicted lower 
limit of the 90%-confidence interval around the vote share forecasts becomes critical. 
This prediction does reflect the intent of the poll manipulation very clearly. In the two 
safe conditions (“10%” and “7%”), the predicted lower limit is on average well above 
5%-threshold. In the two conditions with a close outcome (“5%” and “4%”), the lower 
limit matches the polls with 4.8 and 4.1 percent more or less perfectly. In short, 
participants had the tendency to overestimate the chances of the preferred small party 
but clearly perceived the risk of failure as suggested by the polls. Overall, the poll 
manipulation can be considered as successful. 
[Figure 6 about here] 
 
Attention to Poll Articles and the Perception of Polls and Coalition Signals 
After the initial descriptive assessment, we turn to a more systematic assessment 
of the participants’ behavior and perceptions. We begin by testing the hypothesis that 
political sophisticates not only pay more attention to poll information but are also able to 
make more accurate forecasts of the election outcome. Participants driven by partisan 
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preferences, on the other hand, should neither have particular interest in polls nor a 
motivation to make accurate forecasts. First, we look at the hard behavioral measure of 
attention to poll information, the number of poll articles read by a participant. 
Participants could choose to read between 0 and 5 articles with manipulated poll 
information. To test our hypothesis, we regressed this attention measure on two self-
reported indicators of political motivation, political interest and strength of party 
identification, and the objective measure of factual political knowledge. In addition, three 
attitudes or opinions about polls that might affect attention to polls are included as well: 
attention to pre-election polls in general, the perception of accuracy of polls, and the 
extent to which a participant usually considers polls when making a vote decision. 
Because preliminary analyses showed that the sex of the participant had a surprising 
and unexpected effect on this and some subsequent models, sex is included in the 
model as well.  
The results show that the two political motivations did not affect the selection of 
poll articles, even though strength of party identification comes very close to standard 
levels of significance (Table 1). Instead, political knowledge emerges as a highly 
significant predictor of attention, supporting the notion that political knowledge—
representing better developed cognitive capacities for political information—increases 
interest in more complex, horse-race-related political information. This finding is further 
supported by the fact that self-reported attention to (or interest in) polls in general does 
not affect the actual selection of such information. Only agreement with the goal-
directed attitude of using polls for the vote decision has a significant and positive impact. 
In addition, male respondents were significantly more likely to select poll articles. In 
short, attention to polls appears to be goal-driven and more common among political 
sophisticates. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Moving from the quantity of exposure to the quality of perceptions of poll 
information, we regressed the mean absolute error (MAE) of the party vote share 
predictions, the average deviation from the reported (and manipulated) poll results, on 
several predictors. These include again the two political motivations political interest and 
strength of party identification as well as political knowledge. A new and important 
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predictor of accurate perceptions is the number of articles with poll information read by 
a participant. Because political knowledge already affects the selection of articles, it is 
possible that the impact of reading articles differs for different levels of knowledge. On 
the one hand, political sophisticates should be better able to understand and use poll 
information. On the other hand, political sophisticates should already be able to quickly 
understand the implications after seeing only a single poll article. Reading additional 
articles covering the same poll results therefore may not improve the accuracy of 
predictions to any substantial degree. It is more reasonable to expect that those low in 
political sophistication would benefit more from repeatedly reading the same information. 
In short, while both political knowledge and the reading of additional poll articles can be 
expected to lower prediction errors, the interaction of both variables should show a 
declining error-reduction effect of reading more articles as political knowledge increases.  
To control for the possibility that exposure to real polls before participating in the 
study had influenced the participants, a dichotomous indicator is included for those who 
reported encountering state-specific polls recently.7 
While the error reduction model has only modest explanatory success (Adj. R2 
= .13, Table 2), it demonstrates again the important role of political sophistication, along 
with a conditional effect of reading additional poll articles. Both political knowledge and 
poll articles significantly reduced the errors in the forecasts but show a significant 
interaction effect as well. According to the latter, the error reducing effect of reading poll 
articles diminishes with increasing sophistication, and, in fact, disappears for high 
sophisticates (Figure 7). In other words, the fact that high sophisticates read more poll 
articles does not appear to provide any additional benefit for improving forecasts. Those 
low in political knowledge can improve the accuracy of their predictions rather 
dramatically by reading more articles and even close the gap with high sophisticates. 
Thus, high sophisticates are again the winner of the contest, but the lead is not 
unassailable. It should also be noted that there are no sex differences in the forecast 
error model, and that previous and recent exposure to polls in the media did not have 
any effect on the accuracy of the predictions. 
                                                 
7 It is rather unlikely that exposure to published polls would have undermined our 
manipulation because the real polls were fairly close to our manipulated polls.  
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[Table 2 about here] 
[Figure 7 about here] 
The second manipulation involved the presence or absence of a coalition signal 
involving the preferred major party and the preferred small party of each participant. 
Participants were asked at the end of the study whether they had noticed such a 
coalition signal (between the expected winner—the preferred large party—and each of 
the three small parties). We used the dichotomous indicator of noticing a coalition signal 
for the two preferred parties as our dependent variable and regressed it on the 
randomly assigned coalition signal condition (yes or no) as well as the same predictor 
variables used above, political interest, strength of party identification, number of poll 
articles, and political knowledge.  
The results differ from the poll models in one crucial respect: political knowledge 
does not affect the perception of the coalition signal (Table 3). The presence of a 
coalition signal had the most substantial impact, increasing the likelihood of perceiving 
the correct signal by 31 percentage points. Reading additional poll articles also 
contributed to such a perception, by up to 19 percentage points. Finally, the strength of 
party identification had a significant impact, increasing the likelihood of perceiving the 
signal by up to 19 percentage points. These results suggest that political knowledge is 
not important for picking up such signals, maybe because political sophisticates are 
already aware of the possible coalitions and/or discount any explicit signals send out by 
the parties during campaigns. Much more sensitive to such signals appear to be those 
who identify more strongly with one (or any) of the parties.  
[Table 3 about here] 
The picture that emerges from this first part of the analysis is fairly 
straightforward. Political sophistication increases interest in articles with poll information 
and also leads to more accurate forecasts of the election outcome. However, reading 
additional articles did not improve the forecasting ability of high sophisticates beyond 
the single exposure to the pre-election poll on the results screen. Low sophisticates 
were much more error-prone in their predictions, but they seem to have the opportunity 
to overcome this disadvantage. If they made the effort to read more articles with poll 
information, they were able to completely compensate the knowledge advantage of high 
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sophisticates. However, the fact that low sophisticates read fewer poll articles suggests 
that not many use this opportunity to catch up. Closing this knowledge gap is possible in 
theory but rarely accomplished in practice. Partisan signals, on the other hand, are 
more likely to be picked up by the highly partisan, independent of political sophistication. 
Partisan voters might be inclined to pay more attention to statements by party 
representatives and the potential alliances they propose. So far, the results conform to 
the assumptions of the theory of strategic voting. 
 
Effect of Close Polls and Coalition Signals on Strategic Voting 
The final and critical question is whether close polls and coalition signals have an 
impact on the likelihood of voting for a party other than the most preferred party. For 
theoretical as well as substantive reasons, we look at both a soft and a hard indicator of 
strategic voting. First, we look at any occurrence of what is better called insincere voting, 
that is, any vote for a different party than the one preferred most or ranked highest. 
Second, we use a hard indicator of true strategic voting. To be classified as such a voter, 
participants had to (1) vote for a different party than the one ranked highest or any other 
party that was evaluatively tied (rated the same) with this party, and they (2) had to 
volunteer at least one strategic reason for their vote decision in the open-ended listing 
task after the final vote. Any reference to polls or the chances of any party in the 
upcoming election was considered to be a strategic reason. These two 
operationalizations of strategic voting immediately translate into vastly different 
frequencies. While there are 48 insincere voters in our sample (24%), the number drops 
to only 10 truly strategic voters (5%). The different nature of these two groups comes in 
even sharper focus when we look at the circumstances under which they cast their 
deviating vote. For insincere voters, it did not matter whether the manipulated polls 
created a condition to vote strategically. They were equally likely to cast an insincere 
vote whether or not the polls suggested a close election. Truly strategic voters, on the 
other hand, voted this way only when the polls suggested a close election. In this case, 
the number of strategic voters reached 7.4 percent, a number in line with previous 
survey-based studies. Without the incentive of a close election, not a single strategic 
voter can be found. 
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Poll Condition Insincere Voters* Strategic Voters N 
Save Poll (Control) 16 (24.6%) 0 (0%) 65 
Close Poll 32 (23.7%) 10 (7.4%) 135 
* Including strategic voters. 
 
To better assess the factors that brings people to vote either way, we regressed 
the dichotomous indicator for insincere voting on indicators of a close (pro-strategic 
voting) poll, the presence of a coalition signal as well as strength of party identification, 
political knowledge, sex of participant, and the participant’s agreement with possible 
reasons for (or against) strategic voting: always or habitually voting for the same party 
versus voting for a different party because the preferred party does not have a chance. 
The model for strategic voting follows the same structure, with one important difference. 
Because there is not a single strategic voter in the control condition (making the poll 
condition variable a constant), only respondents in the close poll condition can be 
included. As a consequence, the poll condition variable cannot be included in the model. 
Starting with insincere voting, the poll condition did not have any effect, a finding 
foreshadowed by the table above. The coalition signal, however, had a significant 
positive impact and increased the likelihood of insincere voting by up to 20 percentage 
points. Political sophisticates were more likely to do so as well (49%), as were female 
respondents (18%). While the strength of party identification surprisingly failed to have 
the expected negative impact, agreement with two potential reasons for strategic voting 
showed very powerful effects in the expected directions. Habitual voters of the same 
party were far less likely to vote insincerely (-62%) while those who perceived their 
preferred party as not having a chance were much more likely to vote insincerely (67%). 
These results suggest that participants did not react to the actual closeness of the polls, 
but that they still behaved as expected and departed their party when they perceived a 
situation of a potentially wasted vote (at least in their mind). Unlike the negative result 
for polls, the coalition signal had the expected positive impact, apparently tempting 
voters to follow the party signals even if not warranted by the polls.  
[Table 4 about here] 
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Turning to the hard indicator of strategic voting, the number of significant 
predictors in the model is reduced to two. Just the agreement with the two potential 
reasons for and against strategic voting showed the expected effects. Habitual voters 
were up to 26 percentage points less likely to deviate from their preferred party while 
the perception of no electoral chances for the preferred party boosted the likelihood of 
departing the preferred party by up to 21 percentage points. All other variables, 
including strength of party identification and political knowledge, failed to affect true 
strategic voting. It must be pointed out, however, that these strategic voters were 
exclusively found in the close poll conditions, suggesting indirectly that this behavior 
was conditional on the objective conditions created by the poll manipulation.  
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
 
The goal of this paper was to test the theoretical assumptions about strategic 
voters by investigating the attention and perception of pre-election polls and coalition 
signals and their causal influence on strategic voting. We used an innovative study 
design that embedded a laboratory experiment in a real election campaign to offer 
participants credible and realistic election scenarios while keeping the ability to 
manipulate the factors of interest. Needless to say, the study shares some of the 
shortcomings of laboratory experiments such as a nonrepresentative student sample. 
For this reason, we will extend our analysis by replicating the analysis with survey-
based data (representative state-level pre-election polls) as it becomes available. The 
experimental design allowed us to create theoretically relevant scenarios, customized to 
participants’ actual party preferences. It further gave us the opportunity to measure 
participants’ information selection behavior and prediction abilities in unusual detail. 
This made it possible to put some basic assumptions about strategic voting to a real test, 
something not possible with previous survey-based data. 
Substantively, we found that voters do pay attention to poll information, but that 
this attention depends in particular on the political knowledge of voters and the very 
specific, goal-directed motivation of using poll information to make a voting decision. If 
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we consider poll information to be more complex political information, the nature of the 
readership in our study shows a striking match with this assumption. 
Exposure and attention do not necessarily tell us much about the impact of such 
information. By looking at the (accurate) perception of polls and coalition signals 
embedded in a steady and overwhelming stream of political information, two strikingly 
different findings emerge. First, voters seem to acknowledge polls by adjusting their 
forecasts accordingly (despite engaging in some modest wishful thinking in terms of the 
preferred small party). Political sophisticates appear to quickly adjust their expectations 
of the electoral outcomes to the polls, while less knowledgeable voters have the 
opportunity to do as well if they make the effort to select and read more information 
about the polls. The findings of the poll perception model are consistent with the 
assumption of the strategic voting literature. Political sophisticates appear to have the 
necessary awareness of the electoral chances of the parties. 
The second finding is more surprising. The successful detection of coalition 
signals is not dependent on political sophistication at all but rather driven by partisan 
motivations. Those who identify more closely with parties appear to be more sensitive to 
these signals. If we consider coalition signals as a valuable piece of information for 
strategic voters, the evidence suggest that the signals reach the wrong audience. 
Partisan voters who should be least likely to depart their party to vote strategically are 
most receptive to these signals, while political sophisticates who are better informed 
and who should be more likely to vote strategically seem to miss these signals. The 
latter conclusion might be premature, in particular because we find that political 
knowledge increases the likelihood of insincere voting. 
Our findings about insincere and strategic voting raise crucial questions about 
previous assumptions about strategic voting. First, we show that there is a dramatic gap 
between apparently strategic voters and real strategic voters. Insincere voting might 
have many different reasons, but according to our study, (objective) polls indicating a 
close election outcome is not one of them. Two factors seem to entice many voters to 
depart the preferred party. First, coalition signals by the parties seem to have such an 
influence, even if the polls do not justify such behavior. In fact, the evidence suggests 
that the campaign strategy of using coalition signals seem to be highly effective for the 
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parties. Second, voters who believe that their preferred party has no chance in the 
upcoming election tend to depart the party, independent of what the polls show. Both 
coalition signals and idiosyncratic beliefs about electoral chances do not correspond to 
the assumptions of the classic strategic voter model. Two possible explanations for 
insincere voting should be mentioned. First, insincere voters might be policy-oriented 
and vote according to the issue positions taken by the parties. Second, insincere voters 
might be strategic coalition voters who want to produce a specific coalition no matter 
how close the polls are. Subsequent analyses will investigate these motivations in more 
detail. 
The strategic voter model fares better with our measure of true strategic voting. 
We find such behavior exclusively if polls suggest a close election, but it is a rather 
small number of voters who fall into this category. Taken together, the high number of 
insincere voters and the low number of strategic voters suggest that researchers have 
to be very careful about how to classify and interpret voting behavior that departs from 
the preferred party. The common practice of survey-based studies to consider all 
insincere voters as strategic voters appears premature and misleading. And even if 
voters “rent out” their vote after an appeal by the parties, they are not strategic voters in 
the classic and “sophisticated” sense. They are rather “followers” of the coalition signals 
send out be the political parties.  
The analysis reported here is a first step to test the assumptions of the strategic 
voter model at the micro-level. By comparing and contrasting our experimental findings 
with equivalent survey data, we plan to extend these initial findings with more in-depth 
analyses of the available data. For example, the surprisingly strong performance of 
coalition signals suggests not only that the theory of strategic voting needs some 
revisions if it wants to offer a realistic explanation of political behavior at the micro-level 
but also that insincere voting is a promising area for campaign effects research. 
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Table 1: Attention to Poll Articles 
 
 Number of Poll Articles 
 B SE 
   
Strength of PID .19 (.10) 
Knowledge .09* (.04) 
Political Interest .13 (.17) 
Sex (Male) .60** (.22) 
Attention to Polls .17 (.14) 
Accuracy of Polls -.15 (.18) 
Use of Polls .23* (.10) 
Constant -.19 (.49) 
   
F 8.17** 
Adj. R2 .20 
N 200 
  
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients,  
with standard errors in parentheses.  
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
 
 
Table 2: Errors in Poll Perception 
 
 Mean Absolute Error 
(MAE) of Predictions 
 B SE 
   
Poll Articles (N) -.19** (.19) 
Knowledge -.32** (.07) 
Poll Articles X Knowledge .07** (.02) 
Strength of PID .01 (.11) 
Political Interest .38 (.21) 
Sex (Male) -.19 (.27) 
Polls Seen -.17 (.33) 
Constant 4.01 (.49) 
   
F 5.16** 
Adj. R2 .13 
N 200 
  
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients,  
with standard errors in parentheses.  
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
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Table 3: Perception of Coalition Signal 
 
 Coalition Signal 
 B SE 
   
Coalition Signal 1.66** (.36) 
Poll Articles (N) .29* (.13) 
Knowledge -.01 (.07) 
Strength of PID .42* (.19) 
Political Interest .23 (.30) 
Constant -3.71 (.69) 
   
χ2 40.38 
N 200 
  
Note: Entries are unstandardized logistic regression  
coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses.  
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
 
 
Table 4: Effect of Close Polls and Coalition Signals on Insincere and Strategic 
Voting 
 
 Insincere Voting Strategic Votinga 
 B    SE B       SE 
    
Close Poll .06 (.45) ---  
Coalition Signal .92* (.42) .17 (.81) 
Party No Chance .82** (.22) .65* (.28) 
Habitual Voter -.98** (.21) -1.44* (.51) 
Strength of PID .06 (.21) .71 (.44) 
Knowledge .20** (.08) .05 (.05) 
Sex (Male) -1.57** (.48) -.56 (.93) 
Constant -1.19 (.76) -2.99 (1.45) 
     
χ2 67.19 25.30 
N 200 135 
   
Note: Entries are unstandardized logistic regression coefficients, with standard errors 
in parentheses.  
a “Close Poll” condition only.  
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
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Figure 1: Headlines on Information Board 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Poll Results Page after Pre-Election Poll 
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Figure 3: Plan of Study 
 
Issue Positions 
↓ 
Party Preferences  
(Ranking of Parties) 
↓ 
Basic Information about Parties and Election 
Information Board Training 
↓ 
Election Campaign:  
Information Board Task 
“Pre-Election Poll“ 
↓ 
Order Manipulation 
↓  ↓ 
Vote in Election  
Forecast of Election Outcome 
(Party Vote Shares &  
Confidence Intervals) 
↓  ↓ 
Reasons for Vote Decision 
(Open-Ended & Rating)  Vote in Election 
↓  ↓ 
Forecast of Election Outcome 
(Party Vote Shares &  
Confidence Intervals) 
 Reasons for Vote Decision (Open-Ended & Rating) 
↓  ↓ 
Party Preferences  
(Rating of Parties) 
↓ 
Coalition Preferences 
Expected Coalitions 
↓ 
Political Attitudes  
Demographic Information 
General Attitudes about Polls 
Political Knowledge Scale 
Manipulation Checks 
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Figure 5: Selection of Articles by Category 
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Note: Bars represent the average number of articles selected for reading in six different 
headline categories. Each category was represented with one randomly chosen headline 
on each of the 15 screens. The party categories are based on the party rankings given 
by each participant. 
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Figure 6: Forecasts of Vote Shares and Confidence Intervals for Preferred Small 
Party 
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Figure 7: The Effect of Reading Poll Articles on Forecast Errors, Conditional on 
Political Knowledge 
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Note: The line shows the predicted effect of reading five (versus none) articles with 
manipulated polls on the prediction errors (MAE) at different levels of political knowledge 
SONDERFORSCHUNGSBereich 504 WORKING PAPER SERIES
Nr. Author Title
07-63 Michael F. Meffert
Thomas Gschwend
Polls, Coalition Signals, and Strategic Voting: An
Experimental Investigation of Perceptions and
Effects
07-62 Peter Du¨rsch
Maros Serva´tka
Risky Punishment and Reward in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma
07-61 Wendelin Schnedler
Radovan Vadovic
Legitimacy of Control
07-60 Volker Stocke´ Strength, Sources, and Temporal Development of
Primary Effects of Families’ Social Status on
Secondary School Choice
07-59 Christopher Koch
Martin Weber
Jens Wu¨stemann
Can Auditors Be Independent? - Experimental
Evidence
07-58 Sylvain Be´al PERCEPTRON VERSUS AUTOMATON&8727;
07-57 Sylvain Be´al
Jacques Durieu
Philippe Solal
Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-games
07-56 Alen Nosic
Martin Weber
Determinants of Risk Taking Behavior: The role of
Risk Attitudes, Risk Perceptions and Beliefs
07-55 Michael F. Meffert
Thomas Gschwend
Strategic Voting under Proportional Representation
and Coalition Governments: A Simulation and
Laboratory Experiment
07-54 Klaus Fiedler Pseudocontingencies - A key paradigm for
understanding adaptive cognition
07-53 Florian Kutzner
Peter Freytag
Tobias Vogel
Klaus Fiedler
Base-rate neglect based on base-rates in
experience-based contingency learning
07-52 Klaus Fiedler
Yaakov Kareev
Implications and Ramifications of a Sample-Size
Approach to Intuition
SONDERFORSCHUNGSBereich 504 WORKING PAPER SERIES
Nr. Author Title
07-51 Klaus Fiedler The Ultimate Sampling Dilemma in
Experience-Based Decision Making
07-50 Ju¨rgen Eichberger
David Kelsey
Ambiguity
07-49 Tri Vi Dang Information Acquisition in Double Auctions
07-48 Clemens Kroneberg Wertrationalita¨t und das Modell der
Frame-Selektion
07-47 Dirk Simons
Nicole Zein
Audit market segmentation and audit quality
07-46 Sina Borgsen
Martin Weber
False Consensus and the Role of Ambiguity in
Predictions of Othersı´ Risky Preferences
07-45 Martin Weber
Frank Welfens
An Individual Level Analysis of the Disposition
Effect: Empirical and Experimental Evidence
07-44 Martin Weber
Frank Welfens
The Repurchase Behavior of Individual Investors:
An Experimental Investigation
07-43 Manel Baucells
Martin Weber
Frank Welfens
Reference Point Formation Over Time: A
Weighting Function Approach
07-42 Martin Weber
Frank Welfens
How do Markets React to Fundamental Shocks? An
Experimental Analysis on Underreaction and
Momentum
07-41 Ernst Maug
Ingolf Dittmann
Lower Salaries and No Options: The Optimal
Structure of Executive Pay
07-40 Ernst Maug
Ingolf Dittmann
Christoph Schneider
Bankers and the Performance of German Firms
07-39 Michael Ebert
Nicole Zein
Wertorientierte Vergu¨tung des Aufsichtsrats -
Auswirkungen auf den Unternehmenswert
SONDERFORSCHUNGSBereich 504 WORKING PAPER SERIES
Nr. Author Title
07-38 Ingolf Dittmann
Ernst Maug
Christoph Schneider
How Preussag became TUI: Kissing too Many
Toads Can Make You a Toad
07-37 Ingolf Dittmann
Ernst Maug
Valuation Biases, Error Measures, and the
Conglomerate Discount
07-36 Ingolf Dittmann
Ernst Maug
Oliver Spalt
Executive Stock Options when Managers are
Loss-Averse
07-35 Ernst Maug
Kristian Rydqvist
Do Shareholders Vote Strategically? Voting
Behavior, Proposal Screening, and Majority Rules
07-34 Ernst Maug
Abraham Ackerman
Insider Trading Legislation and Acquisition
Announcements: Do Laws Matter?
07-33 Dirk Simons Independence, low balling and learning effects
07-32 Rainer Greifeneder
Herbert Bless
Relying on accessible content versus accessibility
experiences: The case of processing capacity
07-31 Rainer Greifeneder
Herbert Bless
Depression and reliance on ease-of-retrieval
experiences
07-30 Florian Heiss
Axel Bo¨rsch-Supan
Michael Hurd
David Wise
Pathways to Disability: Predicting Health
Trajectories
07-29 Axel Bo¨rsch-Supan
Alexander Ludwig
Mathias Sommer
Aging and Asset Prices
07-28 Axel Bo¨rsch-Supan GLOBAL AGING - Issues, Answers, More
Questions
07-27 Axel Bo¨rsch-Supan MIND THE GAP: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
INCENTIVES TO BOOST RETIREMENT
SAVING IN EUROPE
07-26 Axel Bo¨rsch-Supan Labor market effects of population aging
